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Comment
Was Death Different Then Than It Is Now?
The Opportunity Presented to the Supreme
Court by Summerlin v. Stewart
Sarah C.S. McLaren*
On July 11, 1982, Warren Summerlin was sentenced to
death for the murder of Brenna Bailey. At that time, Arizona
law allowed a judge, instead of a jury, to sentence a defendant
to death,2 and Judge Marquardt, of the Superior Court of Mari-
copa County, Arizona,3 found two aggravating factors and an
absence of mitigating factors that sufficed to impose the death
sentence on Summerlin.4 Summerlin appealed this sentence."
After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had issued a decision
in his case,6 the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in a different case, State v. Ring,7 leading the Ninth Circuit
to withdraw its decision pending the outcome of Ring.8 After
Ring, which held that under the Sixth Amendment a jury-not
a judge-must find the aggravating factors necessary to impose
a death sentence,9 was decided, the Ninth Circuit voted that
Summerlin's case should be reheard en banc. 10 The Ninth Cir-
* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota; B.A. 2002, Luther Col-
lege. The Author would like to thank editors Kelly Pierce and Andrew Pratt
for their tireless assistance; the Staff and Board of Volume 88 of the Minne-
sota Law Review for their diligent work; Jon, Jeanette, and Erika for their
support; and Jami for his love and encouragement.
1. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc).
2. See id. at 1096.
3. See State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686, 686 (Ariz. 1983).
4. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1090.
5. For a more thorough discussion of the procedural posture of this case,
see infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
6. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001).
7. Ring v. Arizona, 534 U.S. 1103 (2002).
8. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091.
9. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002).
10. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1092.
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cuit subsequently affirmed Summerlin's conviction of first-
degree murder, but reversed the imposition of the death sen-
tence in light of its determination that the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Ring applied retroactively to cases on federal habeas
corpus review."
The Ninth Circuit's determination in Summerlin marked
the third time that a federal court of appeals addressed the is-
sue of the retroactivity of Ring to cases on federal habeas cor-
pus review. 12 Although the Ninth Circuit did not base its hold-
ing on the retroactivity analysis the Supreme Court formulated
beginning in Teague v. Lane," it applied the Teague analysis in
dicta. 4 The Ninth Circuit found that the rule formulated in
Ring fell within Teague's second exception 5-an exception that
the Supreme Court had read very narrowly in the past. 6 The
court's holding is significant in at least three ways. First, the
Summerlin decision vacated the death sentences of all death
row inmates on federal habeas corpus review within the Ninth
Circuit who had been sentenced to death by a judge instead of a
jury.17 Second, the Summerlin decision created a split among
the federal circuits regarding whether or not the Supreme
Court's decision in Ring is retroactive. 8 Finally, the Supreme
Court will have a valuable opportunity to reevaluate the way it
treats the retroactivity of constitutional rules in capital pun-
ishment cases 9 when the Court hears the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion on appeal. 0
11. Id. at 1121.
12. See Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003); Cannon v.
Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir. 2002).
13. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
14. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1108.
15. Id. at 1121.
16. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 208, 231 and accompanying text. This ruling over-
turned the death sentences of prisoners held in states within the Ninth Circuit
in which capital sentencing had previously been done by judges-Arizona,
Montana, and Idaho. Charles Lane, Death Row Inmates Get Legal Break: Fed-
eral Appeals Court Overturns Sentences in More than 100 Cases, WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 2003, at Al. The total number of prisoners affected is 112. See id.
18. See infra notes 127-53, 210 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 249-76 and accompanying text.
20. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review (1) whether the
Ninth Circuit correctly characterized the Ring rule as substantive and (2) if
the Ninth Circuit correctly found the Ring rule to be within the second excep-
tion of Teague. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833, 833 (2003); Schriro v.
Summerlin, No. 03-526, 2003 WL 22429229, at *i (U.S. Sept. 23, 2003).
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This Comment will analyze the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Summerlin and suggest how its decision should be treated by
the Supreme Court on review. Part I briefly describes the ba-
sics of habeas review in capital cases as well as the history of
the Supreme Court's approach to the retroactivity of its deci-
sions. Part II details the Ninth Circuit's holding and reasoning
in Summerlin. Part III analyzes Summerlin's reasoning and
suggests that when the Supreme Court hears Summerlin it
should use the opportunity to modify its retroactivity analysis
in capital punishment cases. This Comment states that the
Ninth Circuit reached the correct holding for the wrong rea-
sons, and proposes that the Supreme Court should announce
that all new rules of constitutional law are retroactive to capi-
tal cases on federal habeas review if their violation would con-
stitute structural error.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO RETROACTIVITY
A. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CONTEXT
The writ of habeas corpus-which allows a prisoner to
challenge the government's authority to hold him or her-is
guaranteed by Article I, Section 9 of the United States Consti-
tution." The Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the federal
courts' use of the writ,22 and the scope of situations in which the
writ could be used greatly expanded in 1867.23 That year, Con-
gress enabled the federal courts to grant the writ "in all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in vio-
lation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
22. LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 156 (1994).
23. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
189 (1980). Scholars dispute exactly how broadly the writ's scope was ex-
panded in the 1867 Act. Compare id. at 190-93 (stating that even if an 1867
senator was mistaken in his belief-that the bill was not limited to freedmen,
but intended as a protection for all those imprisoned because they had violated
a state law that itself violated the Constitution-his belief was still important
because it influenced votes that allowed the bill to pass), with Clarke D.
Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review Reconsid-
ered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1116 (1995) (arguing that the 1867 Act is
best understood as a protection for the rights of freed slaves-who had not yet
been convicted of any crime-under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments).
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States."24 Congress has changed the procedure that courts fol-
low when hearing cases brought on the writ several times since
1867, but the basic scope of the writ as defined by its statutory
language has changed little.25
There are four basic situations in which the writ in its pre-
sent form can be invoked,28 the most controversial of which is
when state prisoners who allege that they are being held in vio-
lation of the federal Constitution use the writ to seek release by
the federal courts.27 The federal courts have interpreted the
scope of this use of the writ very differently over time.28 Its re-
cent expansive use, in which a writ can issue if a state has
failed to meet any constitutional guarantee, 29 has troubled
many.30 The concern that prisoners who had been sentenced to
death were abusing the writ led to Congress's most recent ad-
justment of the procedures by which the writ operates: the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).31
The concern over the present scope of the writ is high-
lighted by the complex stages of the appeal of a death sentence.
After an individual is found guilty of murder and sentenced to
death in state court, he or she has the opportunity to pursue a
direct appeal of his or her conviction and sentence.2 If the de-
24. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (2003)).
25. 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 4261 (2003).
26. The writ can be used (1) on behalf of a foreign citizen who is in custody
for "an act done under color of authority from his country," (2) if a person is
being held by a state for an action done under federal authority, (3) for any
person held in the custody of the United States, or (4) for people "held in viola-
tion of the federal Constitution or laws." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
30. See, e.g., George Cochran Doub, The Case Against Modern Federal
Habeas Corpus, 57 A.B.A. J. 323, 323 (1971); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142,
142 (1970).
31. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, title I, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For an
opinion on what post-AEDPA habeas corpus review will look like, see Larry W.
Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381
(1996). For a description of the legislative history of the bill as well as the mo-
tivations of its proponents, see id. at 422-43.
32. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.03[91
(3d ed. 2002).
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fendant does not gain relief from state courts, he or she may
petition for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.33 Once
the Supreme Court has decided the case or denied the defen-
dant certiorari, or if the period during which a petition for cer-
tiorari may be sought has expired, the defendant's conviction is
considered final.34 The defendant, however, may still seek re-
view by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." An indi-
vidual must first exhaust any state habeas corpus procedures if
they exist, and then he or she may file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court. 6
AEDPA drastically increased the procedural hurdles a de-
fendant must meet to bring a successful habeas petition before
a federal court.37 AEDPA also created an optional system in
which habeas petitions in capital cases must be brought within
a shorter statute of limitations and only a small category of
claims is cognizable.35 States are only allowed to take advan-
tage of this system if they meet certain requirements, such as
providing indigent defendants with counsel during all stages of
the appeals process.3 9 AEDPA illustrates the mistrust and con-
cern with which many have viewed the use of the habeas stat-
ute over the past decades, and it provides a good background
against which one can better understand and critique the Su-
preme Court's approach to the retroactivity of its decisions in
capital cases.
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S STRUGGLE FOR A WORKABLE
RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE
1. The Struggle Begins: The Supreme Court's Approach Before
Teague v. Lane
The Supreme Court has had difficulty formulating a
workable approach to the retroactivity of its decisions. At com-
mon law, a court's judgment was often assumed to be retroac-
33. Id.
34. Id. § 1.03[11].
35. Id.
36. Id. § 1.03[10] n.62.
37. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C § 2244(b) (2003) (limiting the ability of prisoners to
bring successive habeas petitions); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2003) (stating that fac-
tual determinations made by state courts are presumed correct unless the ha-
beas petitioner can show otherwise by clear and convincing evidence).
38. Yackle, supra note 31, at 393-97.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (2003).
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tive-applicable to defendants whose convictions were already
final.4° This stemmed in large part from the view that judges
were not creating new law, but merely discovering principles
that had always existed. Although the Supreme Court followed
this approach for many years, Justices became increasingly
skeptical of it,41 and the Court confronted the issue of retroac-
tivity head-on in Linkletter v. Walker.42
In Linkletter the Court was faced with the issue of whether
or not its holding in Mapp v. Ohio3 should be applied retroac-
tively.44 Mapp held that under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment the states needed to adopt the exclu-
sionary rule-they had to prohibit evidence that had been ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment from being used
in the prosecution's case against a defendant.45 The Court de-
termined the Mapp rule would only be applied to state cases
commencing after Mapp was handed down.46 The test the Court
used in Linkletter to determine retroactivity involved the con-
sideration of the purpose of the constitutional rule in question,
the extent to which states had relied on the previous rule, and
the effect a retroactive application of the new constitutional
rule would have on the administration of justice.47
Although this multifactored test might seem best suited to
a case-by-case balancing analysis, the Court created a bright-
line rule to decide the retroactivity issue in Stone v. Powell.4"
There the Supreme Court addressed a split in the circuits re-
garding whether a state prisoner could have his or her writ of
habeas corpus granted based on a federal court's decision that
evidence used by the state against the petitioner should have
been excluded under the exclusionary rule set forth in Mapp.
The Court announced that if a state has "provided an opportu-
nity for a full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
40. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that "Ujiudicial decisions have had retrospec-
tive operation for near a thousand years").
41. See Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and
the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 56-57 (1965).
42. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
43. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
44. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619-20
45. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
46. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636-40.
47. Id. at 636.
48. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
49. Id. at 469.
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claim"50 a state prisoner invoking federal habeas corpus review
would be prohibited from obtaining relief on the grounds of the
exclusionary rule.5'
The rule developed in Linkletter and Stone was sharply
criticized for allowing the Court to limit retroactivity so that
some, but not all, defendants in similar positions within the
appeals process would be able to benefit from a new constitu-
tional rule.52 The Supreme Court attempted to address these
inequities in Griffith v. Kentucky,53 by declaring that "a new
rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied
retroactively to all cases.., pending on direct review or not yet
final." 4 While Griffith created a bright-line rule for the retroac-
tivity of constitutional rules for cases on direct review, the
problems of the Linkletter test remained for cases brought to
the courts on federal habeas review.
2. The Birth of the Court's Modern Approach to Retroactive
Application of Rules to Cases on Federal Habeas Review:
Teague v. Lane
Two years later in Teague v. Lane,55 Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for the plurality, addressed the question left open by Grif-
fith and formulated a test to determine when a new procedural
constitutional rule should be applied retroactively to petitioners
under federal habeas review. 6 Justice O'Connor changed the
Court's approach to retroactivity in two key ways. First, she de-
clared that retroactivity is a threshold issue-that a court
50. Id. at 494.
51. Id.
52. E.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-59 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Harlan argued that it violated basic principle for the Court
to decide that new constitutional rules would be applied only to the defendant
in the case that announced the new rule and to other cases commencing after
the rule was announced. He did not believe that it should be possible for one
defendant on direct review to benefit from a new rule just because it was dur-
ing the review of her case that the Supreme Court decided to announce the
new constitutional rule, while another defendant whose case was also on di-
rect review would not receive the benefit of the new rule if the Supreme Court
decided to give the new rule prospective application. Id.; see also Mishkin, su-
pra note 41, at 72-73; supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (outlining the
basic stages of the appeals process).
53. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
54. Id. at 328; see also supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (outlin-
ing the basic stages of the appeals process).
55. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
56. Id. at 301-13 (plurality opinion).
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should decide if a proposed constitutional rule would be applied
retroactively to petitioners on federal habeas review before de-
ciding whether the court would adopt the new rule.57 If a fed-
eral habeas petitioner proposed a new constitutional rule and
the court determined that it would not be applied retroactively
to petitioners on federal habeas review, the court would not
even decide the petitioner's claim on the merits."s Justice
O'Connor did not want to adopt a new constitutional rule in a
federal habeas case if granting the petitioner's request would
allow the petitioner the benefit of the new rule, but deny relief
to all other defendants on federal habeas review. 5'
Second, Justice O'Connor took the opportunity to move the
Court away from the Linkletter test.60 Justice O'Connor justi-
fied this move with the inconsistencies produced by the Linklet-
ter standard"' and the purposes of habeas corpus relief.6 2 Justice
O'Connor described the writ of habeas corpus as an incentive
for state courts to conduct their proceedings in a manner con-
sistent with the federal Constitution.63 Given the importance of
finality of judgments and the deterrent function of the writ,
Justice O'Connor announced that few constitutional rules
should be found to be retroactive on federal habeas review. 4
She declared that a "new rule"--defined as a "result [of a case]
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final"65-- of constitutional procedure was not
retroactive to petitioners on federal habeas review unless the
57. Id. at 300-01 (plurality opinion).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 301 (plurality opinion); see supra note 47 and accompanying
text.
61. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 302 (plurality opinion) ("[The Linkletter stan-
dard] has been used to limit application of certain new rules to cases on direct
review, other new rules only to the defendants in the cases announcing such
rules, and still other new rules to cases in which trials have not yet com-
menced.").
62. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
63. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion) ("As [Justice Harlan] ex-
plained in Desist, 'the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incen-
tive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their pro-
ceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards.'"
(quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting))).
64. Id. at 306-08 (plurality opinion).
65. Id. at 301 (plurality opinion).
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rule fell into one of two exceptions . The rule could only be ap-
plied retroactively to petitioners whose convictions had already
become final if the rule put "'certain kinds of... conduct be-
yond the power of the criminal law-making authority to pro-
scribe' 67 or the rule is a "watershed ruleG of criminal proce-
dure"68 that implicates the fundamental fairness of a trial and
whose implementation would increase the accuracy of convic-
tions.69 Although Justice O'Connor's rule only carried a plural-
ity of the Court in Teague, subsequent cases have shown that it
has become the framework within which the Court is deciding
questions of the retroactivity of constitutional rules recognized
70
on federal habeas review.
3. The Development and Application of the Teague
Retroactivity Standard to Capital Punishment Cases
Supreme Court cases since Teague have clarified the test
set forth by Justice O'Connor and have given her formulation
the backing of a majority of Justices of the Court.7" These cases
have also shown that the Court is willing to apply the Teague
standard in capital punishment cases-an issue that was ex-
pressly left open in the plurality opinion of Teague itself.
72
The Court first reached this issue in Penry v. Lynaugh73-a
case that had been argued before Teague was decided. 4 Justice
O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court, but her opinion as a
whole was not joined by a majority of the Court.75 In Penry, a
66. Id. at 311 (plurality opinion).
67. Id. (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 312 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor drew both of these ex-
ceptions from the dissenting opinions of Justice Harlan, id. at 311-12, but she
added the requirement that the rule must greatly increase the chances that
only the guilty will be convicted, id. at 313.
70. See infra Part I.B.3.
71. See infra notes 72-111 and accompanying text.
72. Teague, 489 U.S. at 314 n. 2 (plurality opinion) ("Because petitioner is
not under sentence of death, we need not, and do not, express any views as to
how the retroactivity approach we adopt today is to be applied in the capital
sentencing context.").
73. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled on unrelated grounds by Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
74. Arguments were made in Penry on January 11, 1989, id. at 302, while
the Teague decision was not announced until February 22 of that same year,
Teague, 489 U.S. at 288.
75. Penry, 492 U.S. at 303.
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federal habeas petitioner asked the Court to make a certain
jury instruction mandatory upon request. 6 This jury instruc-
tion would inform jurors that they are allowed to consider miti-
gating evidence of mental retardation and an abused childhood
as they deliberate about whether or not to impose a death sen-
tence.77 The Court determined that the rule the petitioner was
seeking to apply in his case was not "new" for Teague purposes
and therefore never addressed whether or not the rule would
have come within the two exceptions of the Teague standard.8
Justice O'Connor, however, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
as well as Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy, determined in
dicta that finality of judgment concerns were also present in
the capital sentencing context and that the two exceptions to
Teague's rule regarding retroactivity applied in the capital sen-
tencing context as well.79 Penry declared that proposed consti-
tutional rules regarding capital sentencing were subject to a
Teague retroactivity analysis, but it did not provide an example
of how the Teague exceptions should be applied in such a case.80
The Court soon had the opportunity to apply the Teague
analysis in three more cases, each of which involved a federal
habeas petitioner on death row asking that a constitutional
rule be applied retroactively to his case.81 Unlike in Penry, the
Court determined that in each of these three cases the peti-
tioner was proposing a "new" constitutional rule.82 Because
each petitioner was asking, through a federal habeas petition,
for relief via a "new rule,"83 the Court had its first opportunities
76. Id. at 315.
77. Id. at 312-13.
78. When Penry's conviction became final, the Court had already decided
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982). The Court viewed those cases as establishing the principle that "[jiust
as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any
mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of
law, any relevant mitigating evidence." Penry, 492 U.S. at 318 (quoting
Lockett, 455 U.S. at 113-14). Since the Court viewed this rule as the equiva-
lent of the rule for which Penry was asking, it found that Penry was not ask-
ing for a new rule. Id. at 318-19.
79. Penry, 492 U.S. at 314.
80. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
81. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 229 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S.
484, 485-86 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 408-09 (1990).
82. In each of these cases, the Court said the rule the petitioner was seek-
ing was not dictated by Court precedent and was therefore a "new rule." See
Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 229; Saffle, 494 U.S. at 486; Butler, 494 U.S. at 415.
83. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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to apply the two Teague exceptions to claims made by petition-
ers currently sentenced to death.84 An examination of the sub-
stantive claims made by each petitioner as well as the result in
each of these cases is vital to understanding how much guid-
ance the Supreme Court gave for future similar cases.
In Butler v. McKellar, the first of these three cases to be
decided,85 the petitioner's claim rested on the Fifth Amend-
ment.8' Horace Butler urged the Supreme Court to overturn his
capital murder conviction and death sentence by applying the
rule the Court had established in Arizona v. Roberson 7 retroac-
tively to his case on federal habeas review.88 The Roberson rule
declared that the Fifth Amendment prohibits police interroga-
tion whether related or unrelated to the arrest once a suspect
has requested counsel.89 The Court refused to apply this rule
retroactively to cases on habeas review, finding that it did not
meet either of the Teague exceptions.90 The Court quickly dis-
missed the possibility of the Roberson rule falling within the
first exception." The Court then found that because a violation
of the Roberson rule was unlikely to result in an inaccurate
conviction, Butler could not claim the rule's protection under
the second Teague exception either.
2
In the other two cases the petitioner's proposed rule re-
lated not to the conviction stage of a proceeding, but to the sen-
tencing itself.93 In Saffle v. Parks, the petitioner claimed that
84. See supra notes 78, 80 and accompanying text. In each of these three
cases the Court made it clear that it could not reach the merits of the petition-
ers' claims unless the proposed rule first fell into one of the two exceptions
listed in Teague. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 229; Saffle, 494 U.S. at 486; Butler, 494
U.S. at 415.
85. Butler was decided on March 5, 1990. Butler, 494 U.S. at 407. Saffle
was decided the same day, but appears after Butler in the United States Re-
ports. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 484. Sawyer was decided June 21, 1990. Sawyer, 497
U.S. at 227.
86. Butler, 494 U.S. at 411. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o
person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
87. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
88. Butler, 494 U.S. at 408-09.
89. Id. at 411.
90. Id. at 415-16.
91. Id. at 415 (stating that the first exception is "clearly inapplicable").
92. Id. at 416. The Court stated that police interrogation that continued
after a suspect requested counsel would not lessen the chance of an accurate
conviction but would in fact increase the chance of an accurate conviction. Id.
93. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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his rights under the Eighth Amendment94 were violated by a
judge's instruction to the jury to avoid the influence of sympa-
thy when evaluating the mitigating evidence during the sen-
tencing portion of the trial.95 Similarly, in Sawyer v. Smith the
petitioner claimed that the prosecutor's statement to the jury
that the jurors were not ultimately responsible for the imposi-
tion of the capital sentence violated his Eighth Amendment
rights.96 The Court determined that neither of these rules met
either Teague exception.97
In Saffle, after determining that the proposed rule did not
meet Teague's first exception,98 the Court defined the second
exception as "'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicat-
ing the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal pro-
ceeding."99 While the Court said that the exact scope of the
exception was difficult to determine, it cited the defendant's
right to counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright'°° as an
example of a constitutional rule that would fall inside Teague's
second exception.'0 '
In Sawyer, the Court quickly found that the petitioner's
proposed rule did not come within the first Teague exception.
102
The Court then stated that the petitioner had failed to meet the
heavy burden required to fall within Teague's second excep-
tion-his proposed rule did not both adequately improve the ac-
curacy and fairness of sentencing judgments and "'alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' vital to the
94. The Eighth Amendment guarantees that "cruel and unusual punish-
ments [shall not be] inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
95. 494 U.S. 484, 486 (1990).
96. 497 U.S. 227, 231-32 (1990).
97. Id. at 245; Saffle, 494 U.S. at 494-95.
98. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 494-95 (stating that the proposed rule in this case
did not fit within the first exception, which covers rules that would decriminal-
ize a class of conduct or forbid the imposition of the death penalty on a certain
class of people).
99. Id. at 495 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).
100. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
101. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495.
102. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241. In particular, the Court stated:
The first [exception] applies to new rules that place an entire category
of primary conduct beyond the reach of the criminal law, or new rules
that prohibit imposition of a certain type of punishment for a class of
defendants because of their status or offense. This exception has no
application here.
Id. (citations omitted).
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fairness of a sentencing. ' °3 Even though the Court was willing
to assume that the proposed rule would increase the accuracy
of sentencing judgments, the Court declined to find that this
rule was a "bedrock procedural element."1 0 4 The Court ex-
pressed concern that if Sawyer's proposed rule were found to
satisfy the "bedrock procedural element" requirement of the
second Teague exception, then every new rule concerning capi-
tal punishment could be found to satisfy this requirement1 05 By
setting a high standard a rule must meet in order to qualify as
a "bedrock procedural element," the Court saw itself as pre-
venting Penry from being overruled.' Penry had stated that
Teague applied to new rules of capital sentencing. 10 Unless
Teague's second exception was viewed narrowly, the Court be-
lieved that Teague would no longer apply to new rules concern-
ing capital sentencing because, due to the accuracy concerns
present in these rules, all such rules would fall within its sec-
ond exception.' 8
Having decided that none of the petitioners' constitutional
rules could be applied to cases on federal habeas review, the
Court refused to determine any of the cases on their merits.0 9
These three cases illustrate the Court's eagerness to read the
"new rule" requirement broadly and the Teague exceptions nar-
rowly. " These tendencies reflect the Court's concern that ha-
beas corpus review has become disruptive, costly, and less ef-
fective at deterring unconstitutional conduct by state courts"'
The Court believes that only by sticking to a narrow interpreta-
103. Id. at 242 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part))).
104. Id. at 243.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989).
108. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 243.
109. See supra note 84. Some commentators complain that this refusal to
consider potential rules of constitutional law on habeas review has a negative
effect on the Court's ability to analyze substantive law. See Markus Dirk Dub-
ber, Prudence and Substance: How the Supreme Court's New Habeas Retroac-
tivity Doctrine Mirrors and Affects Substantive Constitutional Law, 30 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1992). Concern also exists regarding the impacts of
these refinements of Teague on habeas petitioners currently sentenced to
death. See Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great Writ: Will Death
Sentenced Federal Habeas Corpus Petitioners Be Able to Seek and Utilize
Changes in the Law?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (1991).
110. See supra notes 81-109 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-10 (1989).
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tion of Teague's exceptions can state courts rely on their deci-
sions being upheld as long as they adhered to constitutional
law as it stood when the conviction occurred." 2
4. Retroactivity Analysis and Cases on Direct Review:
Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona
Although the retroactivity of cases that reach the Supreme
Court on federal habeas review is determined as a threshold
matter, the retroactivity of cases the Supreme Court adjudi-
cates while on direct review is not as clear. In Apprendi v. New
Jersey"' and Ring v. Arizona,"' the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to each petitioner on direct review and found each enti-
tled to the constitutional rule he proposed."' Each of these
cases dealt with a Sixth Amendment 6 challenge to a state
law's sentencing structure. In Apprendi, the appellant pled
guilty to two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for
an unlawful purpose and later received an enhanced sentence
based on the trial judge's finding that the crime was triggered
by racial bias."' In Ring, a jury convicted the appellant of fel-
ony murder occurring in the course of an armed robbery."8 Ring
was sentenced to death after a trial judge determined that Ring
was the actual killer during the robbery, that aggravating fac-
tors existed, and that no substantial mitigating factors were
present."19 In both cases, the Supreme Court found that the de-
fendants' right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment was
112. Id. Not all would cabin the purposes of habeas corpus so tightly. See
id. at 327-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Some commentators have stated that
this quasi-cost/benefit analysis should change in cases involving capital pun-
ishment. See David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retro-
activity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 41-50
(1991); Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity, Habeas Corpus, and the Death
Penalty: An Unholy Alliance, 41 DUKE L.J. 160, 163 (1991). Others question
whether the Court's perception of habeas petitions as overly time-consuming
and costly is well founded. See Richard Faust et al., The Great Writ in Action:
Empirical Light on the Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L &
SOC. CHANGE 637 (1991).
113. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
114. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
115. Id. at 609; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
116. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
117. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70.
118. Ring, 536 U.S. at 590.
119. Id. at 594-95.
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violated 120 because defendants are entitled to a jury determina-
tion of every fact---except for a prior conviction-that is neces-
sary for them to be eligible for the ultimate sentence. 121 Under
Griffith v. Kentucky122 these holdings applied automatically to
all defendants whose convictions were not yet final, such as
123buththose proceeding through the phases of direct review, butthe
Court did not directly address whether or not these constitu-
tional rules applied retroactively to petitioners on habeas re-
view. To date, at least eight circuit courts have found Ap-
124prendi's rule not to be retroactive to cases on habeas review,
but the Ninth Circuit's recent determination in Summerlin v.
Stewart125 has created a split among the federal circuits con-
cerning the retroactivity of Ring.
26
5. Previous Federal Circuit Court Determinations Regarding
the Retroactivity of Ring v. Arizona
Two federal circuits have already determined that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona-a case that was be-
fore the court on direct review-does not apply retroactively to
petitioners on federal habeas review.27 In 2002, the Tenth Cir-
cuit made this determination in Cannon v. Mullin.28 In this
case, the court dealt with a petitioner's request for permission
to file a second federal habeas petition. 29 Cannon, previously
sentenced to death by an Oklahoma jury, said that his death
sentence violated the Constitution because the jury had not
120. Id. at 609; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-92.
121. Ring, 536 U.S. at 602; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
122. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
123., See supra notes 34, 56 and accompanying text.
124. See Coleman v. United States, 329 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2003); Curtis v.
United States, 294 F.3d 841, 843-44 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mora,
293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002); Goode v. United States, 305 F.3d 378,
382-85 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 673
(9th Cir. 2002); McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1256-58 (11th Cir.
2001); United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 997-1000 (8th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 147-51 (4th Cir. 2001).
125. 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
126. See infra notes 127-53, 210 and accompanying text.
127. See Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003); Cannon v.
Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir. 2002).
128. Cannon, 297 F.3d at 994.
129. Id. at 991; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2003) ("Before a second or
successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court,
the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order au-
thorizing the district court to consider the application.").
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been instructed that, in order to impose the death sentence, it
needed to find that any aggravating factors it found outweighed
any mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.3 ° Cannon
claimed that the lack of this jury instruction made his death
sentence unconstitutional under Apprendi and Ring.13 ' The
Tenth Circuit never reached the merits of this claim, because it
found that even if such a jury instruction violated Apprendi
and Ring, those decisions were not retroactive to federal habeas
petitioners and consequently the court had no authority to is-
sue a second writ.
3 2
The court denied Cannon's request based on the Supreme
Court's holding in Tyler v. Cain133 that a rule is not retroactive
for the purposes of determining whether a petitioner may bring
a successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) 34
unless the Supreme Court itself has expressly held the rule to
be retroactive to federal habeas petitioners.13' Drawing on lan-
guage from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Tyler, the circuit
court held that unless Cannon could prove that the Court's
holdings in Apprendi and Ring were not new rules, Cannon
could only gain relief from the Ring rule if he could show that
the Supreme Court had previously made it retroactive to cases
on federal habeas review.
The Tenth Circuit also denied Cannon's claim that the
Ring rule was not subject to a Teague retroactivity analysis.
The Supreme Court had previously held that only rules of pro-
cedure, not substantive criminal statutes, were subject to a
130. Cannon, 297 F.3d at 992.
131. Id. at 991; see supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (describing
the standards established by Apprendi and Ring).
132. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application
under section 2254 shall be dismissed unless-(A) the applicant
shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral [habeas corpus] review by the Su-
preme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (B)(i) the factual
predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously
through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the
claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would
be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but
for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
Id.
133. 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
134. See supra note 132.
135. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663.
136. Cannon, 297 F.3d at 993-94.
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Teague retroactivity analysis.'37 The Court found that a Teague
analysis did not apply to proposed constitutional rules that
asked the Court to interpret the meaning of a substantive
criminal statute enacted by Congress.1 38 The Tenth Circuit de-
clined to find that the rule established in Ring was similar to
such a rule.3 9 It held that Ring's rule was procedural for retro
activity purposes because Ring was based on the Sixth
Amendment and therefore merely an extension of Apprendi to
the capital sentencing context,14 and the Apprendi rule had re-
cently been found by the Tenth Circuit to be procedural.'
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of Ring's retroac-
tivity even more recently in Turner v. Crosby.' 2 Turner, who
had been convicted of two counts of first-degree murder 3 and
sentenced to death on one of those counts,'" claimed that his
Sixth Amendment rights had been violated under the standard
established in Ring."' Turner asserted that Florida's capital
sentencing structure-in which a jury presents an advisory
sentence of life imprisonment or death to the trial judge, but
the trial judge is not bound by the jury's recommendation-
violated Ring.4 6 The court first determined that since Turner
had not raised this claim before the Florida courts, he was pro-
cedurally barred from presenting this claim on federal habeas
review, 47 but it went on to consider in dicta whether Ring
would apply retroactively to Turner even if he were not proce-
durally barred. 1
48
137. Id. at 994 (stating that Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998),
held that "Teague's retroactivity analysis does not apply to substantive inter-
pretations of criminal statutes").
138. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620.
139. Cannon, 297 F.3d at 994.
140. Id.
141. Id. (stating that in United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir.
2002), the court found Apprendi to establish a rule that was procedural for
Teague purposes).
142. 339 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2003).
143. Id. at 1261.
144. Id. at 1267.
145. Id. at 1280; see supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (describing
the standards established by Apprendi and Ring).
146. Turner, 339 F.3d at 1280.
147. Id. at 1281-82 (stating that when a state habeas corpus petitioner
does not properly raise federal claims in state court, the petitioner is barred
from presenting the same claim in federal court unless there is a showing of
cause for and actual prejudice from the default).
148. Id. at 1282.
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The Eleventh Circuit first found that Ring was a proce-
dural rule for the purposes of a Teague analysis.1 " Like the
Tenth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit had previously found Ap-
prendi to be a rule of criminal procedure,' and the Turner
court determined that Ring merely extended the Apprendi rule
to the capital sentencing context and was procedural for retro-
activity purposes.' The court then evaluated whether or not
the Ring rule fell within the Teague exceptions. The court
concluded that Ring's rule clearly did not fall within the first
Teague exception and that because the rule did not enhance the
likelihood of more accurate sentencing determinations, Turner
could not find protection in the second exception either."
3
In light of these decisions of the Tenth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, a close examination and analysis of the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Summerlin-determining that Ring is retroactive for
Teague purposes-is both intriguing and valuable.
II. A NEW APPROACH TO RING v. ARIZONA:
SUMMERLIN v. STEWART
Like the petitioners in Turner and Ring,"' Warren Sum-
merlin was found guilty of murder by a jury, and he was then
sentenced to death based on the determination of a trial
judge. 155 A closer look at the facts of Summerlin, however, dem-
onstrates that the unique qualities of this case extend far be-
yond the holding ultimately reached by the Ninth Circuit.
After Brenna Bailey, a delinquent-account investigator for
Finance America, was reported missing on April 29, 1981, an
anonymous caller informed police that Summerlin had mur-
dered Bailey."56 The next day police officers found Bailey's car a
149. Id. at 1284-85.
150. See McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001).
151. Turner, 339 F.3d at 1284 ("Just as Apprendi 'constitutes a procedural
rule because it dictates what fact-finding procedure must be employed,' Ring
constitutes a procedural rule because it dictates what fact-finding procedure
must be employed in a capital sentencing hearing." (quoting United States v.
Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 147 (4th Cir. 2001), cited with approval in McCoy, 266
F.3d at 1256)).
152. Id. at 1285-86; see also supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text
(describing the two exceptions of Teague).
153. Turner, 339 F.3d at 1285-86.
154. See supra notes 119-46 and accompanying text.
155. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc); see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
156. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084-85. The caller was later found to be
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mile from Summerlin's house with Bailey's body in the trunk. 1'
While a search warrant was being executed at Summerlin's
house, Summerlin made some incriminating statements, which
precipitated his arrest for the murder of Bailey.158
The state trial court appointed an attorney from the public
defender's office to represent Summerlin. This attorney nego-
tiated an extremely favorable plea agreement with the prosecu-
tor under which Summerlin would plead guilty to second-
degree murder and aggravated assault. 60 This deal fell
through, however, in part due to the fact that Summerlin's at-
torney had a romantic encounter with the prosecutor.16 1 As a
result of this conflict of interest, Summerlin's attorney with-
drew, and the Arizona Attorney General's Office took control of
the prosecution of the case-taking the plea off the table.62 Af-
ter the jury convicted Summerlin of first-degree murder and
sexual assault,'63 Judge Marquardt sentenced Summerlin to
death.' The judge was later discovered to be a heavy user of
marijuana, 6' and although the district court did not allow dis-
covery on the issue of the amount of marijuana that he was us-
ing during Summerlin's sentencing, the Ninth Circuit found
support in the record for Summerlin's contention that the judge
was having "short-term memory loss" or "difficulty concentrat-ing.166
Like the facts of Summerlin, the procedural posture of the
case differs from any of the cases this Comment has so far ex-
amined. After Summerlin's conviction and death sentence had
been affirmed on direct appeal by the Arizona Supreme
Court,'67 Summerlin made an initial petition for habeas corpus
in federal district court as well as four postconviction attempts
in state court to overturn his conviction.' 6' After these endeav-
Summerlin's mother-in-law. Id. at 1085. She stated that she knew Summerlin
had murdered Bailey because of her daughter's "extra-sensory perception." Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1086.
161. Id. at 1086-87.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1088.
164. Id. at 1090.
165. Id. at 1089.
166. Id. at 1090.
167. State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686 (Ariz. 1983).
168. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091.
17492004]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ors proved unsuccessful, Summerlin filed an amended petition
in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.169 The federal district court denied Summerlin's peti-
tion, and Summerlin moved to vacate the district court's judg-
ment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).'70 The dis-
trict court denied this motion, but did issue a certificate of
probable cause, which made it possible for Summerlin to appeal
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b)(1).' 7'1 On ap-
peal to the Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel issued an opinion
and remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the judge who sentenced Sum-
merlin was competent at the time when he deliberated the im-
position of the death penalty.'7 2 Soon after the case was re-
manded, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ring.'7 3 Since
this enabled the Supreme Court to reconsider the constitution-
ality of judges making factual determinations necessary for the
imposition of the death penalty-an issue that Summerlin had
raised in his habeas petition-the Ninth Circuit withdrew its
decision and waited for the Supreme Court's decision in Ring.1
4
After Ring, Summerlin moved to stay the Ninth Circuit's pro-
ceedings in his case so he could ask the Arizona Supreme Court
to recall the mandate in his direct appeal' 5 and consider Ring's
application in his case. 116 After the Arizona Supreme Court de-
169. Id.
170. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (stating that parties may file a mo-
tion to amend or alter a judgment within ten days of the entry of that judg-
ment).
171. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091; see also FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)(1) ("In a
habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises from
process issued by a state court ... the applicant cannot take an appeal unless
a circuit justice or a circuit or district judge issues a certificate of appealabil-
ity. . . ."). A certificate of appealability, referred to by the Ninth Circuit as a
"certificate of probable cause," Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091, may only be is-
sued "if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a consti-
tutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).
172. Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd on reh'g en
banc, 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). In its en banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that there was evidence in the record that Judge Marquardt
had been heavily using marijuana the weekend during which he deliberated
on Summerlin's sentence. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1090.
173. Ring v. Arizona, 534 U.S. 1103 (2002).
174. Summerlin v. Stewart, 281 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2002).
175. Recalling the mandate is a possibility under Arizona law. For a de-
scription of this procedure, see Lindus v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York,
438 P.2d 311, 313 (Ariz. 1968).
176. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091.
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nied this request, the Ninth Circuit panel asked for a vote of
the Ninth Circuit judges to determine whether Summerlin's
case should be heard en banc. The majority of the nonrecused
active judges of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals voted to
hear Summerlin's case, which was heard en banc on December
10, 2002.78
Thus, the Ninth Circuit became the third circuit court to
decide whether or not the Supreme Court's determination in
Ring v. Arizona should be applied retroactively to petitioners
on federal habeas corpus review.79 The court did not limit itself
to determining this question, however, but proceeded in dicta to
apply a Teague retroactivity analysis to the Ring rule.
8 0
The Ninth Circuit first determined that it had jurisdiction
to hear Summerlin's case under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and found
Summerlin's claim that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel to be unpersuasive. 8 The court then turned to the is-
sue of whether the Supreme Court's decision in Ring was sub-
ject to a Teague retroactivity analysis'8. The Ninth Circuit
stated that if the Ring decision was one of substantive law, the
Teague analysis would not be applicable in determining
whether the Ring rule applies retroactively to cases on federal
habeas corpus review. 3 If the Ring decision was procedural, it
would apply retroactively to petitioners like Summerlin only if
it was a rule that had essentially existed before Ring or if it fell
within one of the two Teague exceptions.'8 8 After acknowledging
that the rule in Ring had some procedural aspects, 85 the Ninth
Circuit determined that Ring should be considered substantive
and not subject to a Teague retroactivity analysis. 6 The Ninth
177. Id. at 1092.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 127-53 and accompanying text; infra note 182 and
accompanying text.
180. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1108 (stating that "a full Teague analysis
of the unique procedural aspects of Ring provides an independent basis upon
which to apply Ring retroactively to cases on collateral review").
181. Id. at 1092-96.
182. Id. at 1096.
183. Id. at 1099 ("The threshold question ... is whether the rule the peti-
tioner seeks to apply is a substantive rule or a procedural rule, because
'Teague by its terms only applies to procedural rules.'" (quoting Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998))).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1101 (stating that the Ring rule is procedural in the sense that
it affects the process by which capital sentencing must take place).
186. Id. at 1108.
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Circuit reasoned that because the Ring Court found Arizona's
capital murder statute to violate the Sixth Amendment's rightS• 187
to a jury trial, Ring was more analogous to Bousley v. United
States8" and Richardson v. United States'89-two cases in which
the proposed rules were ones of substantive law-than to the
rule created in Apprendi v. New Jersey.9 ° The Ninth Circuit
noted that the Arizona Supreme Court had previously held that
Ring was not a substantive decision,'9' but stated that since
these decisions ultimately rested on an interpretation of federal
cases, it was not bound by a state supreme court decision.9
Although the Ninth Circuit could have declared Ring to be
retroactive to cases on federal habeas review after determining
the rule to be substantive,9 3 the court performed a full Teague
analysis on Ring as "an independent basis upon which to apply
Ring retroactively to cases on collateral review." 194 The court
organized its analysis into a three-fold inquiry. The court first
determined the date on which Summerlin's conviction became
final.9 The court then analyzed whether or not the result in
Ring was compelled by the existing legal precedent on that date
-whether or not it was a "new rule" for Teague analysis pur-
poses.9 6 Finally, the court considered whether the Ring rule fit
either of the exceptions to the retroactivity bar found in
Teague .197
187. Id. at 1104-O5.
188. 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (stating that the Teague retroactivity analy-
sis does not apply to a decision in which the Supreme Court had interpreted a
statute).
189. 526 U.S. 813 (1999). The Ninth Circuit found the Richardson rule,
which required that juries be unanimous when finding individual violations as
pieces of a continuing criminal enterprise, to be substantive for Teague pur-
poses. United States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2003) (per cu-
riam).
190. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Ninth Circuit found the rule in Apprendi to
not be retroactive under Teague. United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282
F.3d 664, 673 (9th Cir. 2002). In Apprendi, the Supreme Court stated that
"[tihe substantive basis for New Jersey's enhancement is thus not at issue."
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475.
191. State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 832 (Ariz. 2003).
192. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1106.
193. See id. at 1099, 1108.
194. Id. at 1108.
195. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
196. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
197. See infra note 200.
1752 [Vol 88:1731
WAS DEATH DIFFERENT THEN?
After determining that Summerlin's conviction had become
final when his opportunity for direct review of his conviction
expired1 9 and that legal precedent at that time did not compel
the decision later rendered in Ring, 99 the Ninth Circuit exam-
ined Teague's two exceptions. 2 ' The court decided that the first
exception did not apply to the Ring rule,20' but determined that
since the Ring rule "seriously enhance[d] the accuracy of [capi-
tal sentencing hearings] and... alter[ed] our understanding of
bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of [these
hearings]"2  it fell within Teague's second exception.02 The
court stated that the Ring rule would enhance the accuracy of a
capital sentencing-a proceeding demanding an especially high
degree of accuracy under the Eighth Amendment 2°4-by requir-
ing that such a weighty decision rest with a jury instead of a
single judge.20 5 Juries, the Ninth Circuit stated, can be better
isolated from inadmissible evidence, are more insulated from
the political process, and are more representative of the moral
pulse of the community.2 6 The court also decided that by en-
forcing the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to a trial by a jury
the Ring rule "redefined the structural safeguards implicit in
our concept of ordered liberty."2 ' The court based this decision
on its findings that any future failure to follow the Ring rule
would "constitute structural error"20 ' and that Ring's impact
would far exceed that of other rules which circuit courts have
found to be within the second Teague exception. '0 9 For these
reasons, the Ninth Circuit determined that Ring met the re-
maining requirements of Teague's second exception, and there-
198. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1108 (determining that Summerlin's convic-
tion became final in 1984 when his opportunity to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court expired).
199. Id. at 1109 (stating that "there is no doubt that Ring announced a new
rule").
200. Id. at 1109-22.
201. Id. at 1109.
202. Id. The Ring rule states that under the Sixth Amendment only a
judge, not a jury, can make the factual findings necessary to impose the death
sentence on a defendant. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002).
203. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1121.
204. Id. at 1109-10; cf. Dow, supra note 112, at 42-50; Metzner, supra note
112, at 163.
205. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1110-11.
206. Id. at 1113-15.
207. Id. at 1121.
208. Id. at 1117.
209. Id. at 1120; see also infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
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fore, even if the Ring rule was procedural, Summerlin's death
sentence would have to be vacated.21 °
III. CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT:
AN ANALYSIS OF SUMMERLIN AND THE POSSIBILITIES
IT PRESENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING Is FAULTY, BUT IT
REACHED THE RIGHT RESULT
1. The Ring Rule Was Substantive, Not Procedural
While the Ninth Circuit reached the correct determination
in Summerlin, its opinion can be justly criticized for finding
that the Ring rule was substantive and not procedural. Judge
Rawlinson dissented from the majority opinion in Summerlin,
declaring that the court's treatment of the Ring rule as one of
substantive law could not be reconciled with Ninth Circuit
precedent 211 that the Apprendi rule was procedural for
212
retroactivity purposes. Judge Rawlinson's belief that the Ring
rule cannot be viewed as a rule concerning substantive criminal
law as long as the Apprendi rule is seen as one of procedural
law is strengthened by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits'
similar determinations. Both circuits found Ring's rule to be
one of procedure for Teague retroactivity purposes, and both
emphasized that the Ring rule was merely an extension of the
rule in Apprendi .213
In addition to the problem of the Ninth Circuit's own
precedent and the persuasive authority of two other circuits,
the court's determination that Ring's rule is substantive is
likely outside of its authority. The Arizona Supreme Court had
previously found the Ring rule to be one of criminal proce-
dure.21 ' The majority opinion in Summerlin tries to discount
this by stating that the Arizona Supreme Court's determination
was based on federal law and was therefore not binding on a
210. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1121.
211. United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002).
212. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1126-27 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting); see San-
chez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 668 (citing Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.
2000)).
213. See supra notes 138-41, 149-51 and accompanying text.
214. State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 833 (Ariz. 2003).
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federal court. '15 This argument runs into trouble, however,
when viewed in light of the Supreme Court's previous deference
to the Arizona Supreme Court's portrayal of its capital sentenc-
ing law. 16 In Ring, the Supreme Court's holding rested in part
on the Arizona Supreme Court's decision that under Arizona
law a judge's factual findings were a necessary part of a defen-
dant's death sentence.1 The Court used this decision to help
support its conclusion that the Apprendi majority-which had
said that a jury's verdict carried the maximum penalty of death
under Arizona law-had incorrectly characterized Arizona's
capital punishment law.18 Whether Arizona's death sentence is
authorized by a jury's verdict or a judge's findings is key be-
cause the Supreme Court has held that under the Sixth
Amendment every factual finding necessary to make a defen-
dant eligible for a sentence must be found by a jury.2 19 Simi-
larly, whether the Ring decision is seen as affecting the process
by which a sentence determination is made or as changing sub-
stantive criminal law is key to whether Summerlin's claim is
subject to a Teague retroactivity analysis. While each determi-
nation has enormous implications concerning an appellant's or
petitioner's fate in federal court, each is at its core a determina-
tion of the character of state law and rests properly within the
authority of the state courts.20
2. The Ring Rule Falls Within Teague's Second Exception
Even though the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Ring's
rule was procedural for Teague purposes, the Ninth Circuit's
judgment in that case-that Summerlin should be afforded the
benefit of the Ring rule even though he is a federal habeas peti-
tioner-is sound. This is because the Ninth Circuit correctly
found that the Ring rule is within Teague's second exception.
The Ninth Circuit based the requirements of the second
Teague exception on Supreme Court precedent,2 ' stating that
such a rule "must (1) seriously enhance the accuracy of the pro-
ceeding and (2) alter our understanding of bedrock procedural
215. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1106.
216. Id. at 1127-28 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
217. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 603 (2002).
218. See id. at 603, 609
219. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
220. See Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177 (1940) ("The high-
est state court is the final authority on state law. . . ." (citations omitted)).
221. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990).
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elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding." 22 The
court first found the accuracy for sentencing hearings to be en-
hanced by Ring's requirement that only juries, not judges, can• " . I223
impose the death sentence on an individual .
In order to evaluate Summerlin one must first determine
what an "accurately decided" death sentence entails. In a deci-
sion of guilt or innocence, jurors are required to determine
whether or not the facts necessary to constitute the elements of
the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.224 In
capital sentencing decisions, jurors still must determine
whether or not aggravating factors are present beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, but they are allowed to take into consideration
any substantial mitigating factor.2 5 This more flexible frame-
work for sentencing decisions reflects the unique need for indi-
vidualized sentencing in a capital context, 26 which is based not
only on the lack of usual instruments used to modify a sen-
tence-such as probation or work release227-but also on the
Court's recognition that "in a capital sentencing proceeding, the
Government has 'a strong interest in having the jury express
the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life
or death.' 2" The accuracy of a capital sentencing decision,
therefore, is properly viewed as dependent on whether or not
the sentencing party has applied community moral values
when considering mitigating and aggravating factors. It is
counterintuitive to ask one judge to act in accordance with the
community's conscience because twelve jurors selected from all
walks of life are likelier to have a fuller view of what the com-
munity actually values. Given the goals of capital sentencing,
jury sentencing decisions are inherently more accurate, and
Ring's rule "improve[s] [the] accuracy"229 of capital sentencing
decisions.
In addition to increasing the accuracy of capital sentencing
proceedings, Ring's rule also "alter[ed] our understanding of
222. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc);
see Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242 (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262
(1969) and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).
223. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
224. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
225. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (1999) (quoting Lowenfield
v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1988)).
229. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990).
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bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the
proceeding., 30 The Ninth Circuit determined that the Ring rule
met this criterion in part based on its determination that Ring
violations will be considered structural error-not subject to
harmless error analysis.231 Structural error is defined as a "de-
fect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds,
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." 32 In con-
trast, the Supreme Court has found that harmless error-
"error that does not affect a party's substantive rights or the
case's outcome",233--does not require a conviction to be over-
turned.3 4
The Court has found structural error to exist in the Sixth
Amendment context in situations such as that in Sullivan v.
Louisiana.235 In that case, the Court found that a deficient rea-
sonable-doubt instruction was not subject to harmless error
analysis.2 36 The Sullivan Court stated that a constitutionally
defective reasonable-doubt instruction corrupts all of the jury's
findings.237 If the Court is not willing to allow a conviction to
stand where a jury received a constitutionally defective reason-
able-doubt instruction, findings that were never made by the
constitutionally mandated body, such as by a judge rather than
a jury in Summerlin, are arguably more corrupted and should
be viewed as structural error.
In his dissent in Summerlin, Judge Rawlinson countered
this argument by stating that the Ring Court clearly held that
Ring violations would not constitute structural error.3 8 Al-
though the Court stated in a footnote that it would allow the
lower courts to decide whether the alleged error in this case
was harmless,239 it is a stretch to characterize this as a state-
ment that the Supreme Court will not view Ring violations as
structural. The Supreme Court did not explicitly decide
whether errors under Ring would be structural or harmless,
230. See supra note 221-22 and accompanying text.
231. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
232. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
233. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 243 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
234. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
235. 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
236. See id. at 280.
237. Id. at 281.
238. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
239. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 n.7 (2002).
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and in light of its precedent in Sullivan,24 ° the Ninth Circuit
was correct to determine that the errors are structural.
Having determined that Ring errors are structural, they
can be found to meet the final criterion of Teague's second ex-
ception more easily. 4' The Court has said that once structural
error is present in a proceeding, "no criminal punishment may
be regarded as fundamentally fair."2 42 Having determined
Ring's error to be structural, the Ninth Circuit vacated the
death sentences of all capital defendants in its jurisdiction who
had been sentenced to death by a judge rather than a jury.243
The impact of the court's ruling demonstrates how the Ring
rule alters procedural notions of justice and thus meets
Teague's second exception. This determination is strengthened
when considered alongside the other rules that have been found
24by other circuits to meet Teague's second exception. For ex-
ample, the Fourth Circuit found that the Mills/McKoy rule
24
1
was retroactive under Teague's second exception. 246 The Court
in Mills struck down the petitioner's capital sentence due to the
likelihood that the verdict form made jurors think they were
unable to consider mitigating evidence unless they unani-
mously agreed that a mitigating circumstance existed.247 Sen-
tencing decisions made in violation of Mills IMcKoy dealt only
with potential juror misunderstandings and consequent consti-
tutional violations. Ring violations are more damaging as they
are a clear deprivation of Sixth Amendment rights, and they
therefore meet the second exception of Teague even more eas-
ily.
For the above reasons, the Ninth Circuit correctly found
the Ring rule to be within Teague's second exception, and the
judgment in Summerlin is justified on those grounds.
240. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (describing the final crite-
rion for the second Teague exception).
242. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986).
243. See supra note 17.
244. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc).
245. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494
U.S. 433 (1990).
246. Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448, 459 (4th Cir. 1992).
247. See Mills, 486 U.S. at 383-84.
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B. SUMMERLIN PROVIDES THE SUPREME COURT WITH A
VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO REVISE ITS APPROACH TOWARD
RETROACTIVITY IN HABEAS APPEALS BY CAPITAL PRISONERS
An analysis of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Summerlin
is worthwhile in light of the guidance it can give to other
courts, but Summerlin itself is also interesting because of the
opportunity it provides to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari and agreed to review the Ninth
Circuit's decision, 248 enabling the Court to refine the approach it
takes towards retroactivity analysis in cases dealing with capi-
tal sentencing. When reviewing the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Summerlin, the Court should declare that any new constitu-
tional rule whose violation the Court would deem to constitute
structural error should be found to meet the requirements of
Teague's second exception in capital sentencing cases. 249 The
Court should announce this approach because (1) the Court's
approach to capital punishment sentencing decisions would be
more consistent, (2) AEDPA has already ensured that states'
interest in finality is safe-guarded, and (3) this new rule would
not require the Court to overrule any existing precedent.
Perhaps the most powerful reason for the Supreme Court
to adopt this proposed rule is that it would make the Court's
approach to capital punishment sentencing decisions more con-
sistent. Many of the Supreme Court's decisions concerning
capital sentencing decisions emphasize that the Eighth
Amendment creates a heightened requirement for procedural
rights in the capital context that does not exist in the normal
sentencing context. For example, under Lockett v. Ohio,25° a
capital defendant can appeal his or her sentence based on the
fact that the jury was not allowed to consider a relevant miti-
gating factor.251 In any sentencing context outside of the capital
context, there is no similar requirement . In Ring, while the
248. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
249. See Metzner, supra note 112, at 187 (proposing this solution, but not
discussing all of the following rationales).
250. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
251. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
252. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) ("[O]ur cases cre-
ating and clarifying the 'individualized capital sentencing doctrine' have re-
peatedly suggested that there is no comparable requirement outside the capi-
tal context, because of the qualitative difference between death and all other
penalties.").
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Court based its holding on the Sixth Amendment,"' the Court
reaffirmed its position that the Eighth Amendment places sub-
stantive restraints on capital sentencing procedures.254
Justice Ginsburg's opinion of the Court in Ring was joined
by four other Justices.25 5 Although Justice Scalia, who joined
the opinion of the Court, wrote separately to state that the
Eighth Amendment ought not to impose procedural require-
ments on states, Justice Breyer's concurrence states that jury
sentencing in capital cases is required by the Eighth Amend-
ment.257 Therefore, in a very recent opinion of the Supreme
Court, a majority of Justices continue to believe that the Eighth
Amendment limits a state's discretion more greatly in the capi-
tal sentencing context-that death is different. It is odd for the
Court to insist that the Eighth Amendment requires more from
states in capital sentencing than in other criminal contexts, yet
to apply Teague's second exception-designed to allow all de-
fendants to exercise key procedural rights-no differently in
capital sentencing situations.2 ' By declaring that any new con-
stitutional rule whose violation the Court would deem to consti-
tute structural error falls within Teague's second exception in
capital sentencing cases, the Court would affirm its stance that
death is different.
In addition to increasing the consistency of the Court's
treatment of capital punishment, the adoption of AEDPA 259 has
addressed the apprehensions of those concerned with states' in-
terest in the finality of judgments and in timely execution of
death-row inmates. The Supreme Court has made it clear that
federal habeas review must be exercised with respect for states'
interest in finality of judgments.26 0 Finality, however, cannot be
the only value to consider when formulating rules to apply in
253. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
254. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002) ("[Olur cases have insisted
that the channeling and limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the
death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently
minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." (citing May-
nard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988))).
255. Id. at 587.
256. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring).
258. For a similar argument, but one made in 1991 without the benefit of
the Ring opinion, see Metzner, supra note 112, at 180-81.
259. See supra notes 31, 37-39 and accompanying text (describing
AEDPA).
260. See supra notes 63-64, 79 and accompanying text.
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federal habeas review. If it was, the existence of federal habeas
review of state court judgments could not be explained. Habeas
review is also concerned with the policy "that [at least some]
federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be de-
nied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial
review. 261
The states' interest in finality of judgments has also been
addressed through the recent enactment of AEDPA.262 For ex-
ample, AEDPA amends 28 U.S.C. § 2244 so that state prisoners
now have a one-year statute of limitations on the time in which
they can file an application for a writ of habeas corpus in fed-
eral court.263 AEDPA also imposes strict limits on a prisoner's
ability to file successive petitions for habeas corpus.264 Given
these new and significant limitations on a prisoner's ability to
gain relief in federal court based on the writ, it is appropriate
for the Court to consider interests besides finality when consid-
ering its approach to retroactivity in the capital sentencing con-
text. The structural error rule embodies an individual's interest
in being able to benefit from full constitutional protections, and
thus would be a good counterweight to AEDPA's protection of
states' interest in finality.
In addition to the above justifications for the structural er-
ror rule, it is important to note that its adoption would not re-
quire the Supreme Court to overrule any precedent. While this
is not in itself an independent reason to enact a rule, it does
make adoption of a new legal approach less frightening to judi-
cial conservatives. While Supreme Court precedent has made
it clear that constitutional rules concerning capital sentencing
determinations are subject to the Teague retroactivity analy-
sis,266 no previous decision has precluded the Court from treat-
ing capital sentencing cases differently within the Teague
framework. In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court did not even ap-
.. 268
ply the petitioner's proposed rule to the Teague exceptions. In
261. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963).
262. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
263. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2003).
264. See id. § 2244(b); supra note 132.
265. See Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,
494 (1987) ("[Tlhe doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the
rule of law.").
266. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
267. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
268. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (stating that the Penry rule
was not a "new rule" and therefore not subject to Teague's retroactivity analy-
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Butler v. McKellar,269 Saffle v. Parks,27 ° and Sawyer v. Smith,2 '
the Court found that the proposed rules fell outside of Teague's
second exception, 27 2 but the Court did not define the exact scope
of the exception.273 In Sawyer, the Court did express concern of
finding capital sentencing rules to automatically meet the re-
quirements of Teague's second exception because of fear that
this would require the Court to overrule Penry.2"4 The proposed
rule, however, would not require Penry to be overruled."5 The
Court could adopt the proposed rule and still use the Teague
retroactivity framework in capital sentencing cases. The Court
could recognize that due to the heightened concern for accuracy
and fairness in capital sentencing decisions (embodied in
stricter procedural requirements under the Eighth Amend-
ment), both criteria of Teague's second exception... are more
easily met by rules in capital sentencing cases. Given the Su-
preme Court's heightened concern for correct procedure in capi-
tal cases, and AEDPA's emphasis on helping states to execute
capital sentences within a reasonable amount of time, the
adoption of the proposed rule would neither constitute a grave
departure from precedent nor an abandonment of the principles
of finality which the Court has emphasized in the past.
CONCLUSION
Summerlin v. Stewart presents an intersection of capital
sentencing jurisprudence and retroactivity analysis. By deter-
mining that Ring v. Arizona applies retroactively to petitioners
on federal habeas review, the Ninth Circuit has created a cir-
cuit split and has given the Supreme Court the opportunity to
revisit its approach to the retroactivity of constitutional rules
relating to capital sentencing decisions.
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion is based on the faulty prem-
ise that the Ring rule is substantive for Teague purposes, but
sis).
269. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
270. 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
271. 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
272. See supra notes 92, 97 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (stating that Penry held
that constitutional rules dealing with capital sentencing were subject to a
Teague analysis).
276. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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its analysis of the Ring rule and its relation to the second
Teague exception provides valuable guidance for other circuits.
In addition, the Summerlin opinion is a good springboard for a
refinement of the Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis. On
review, the Supreme Court should find that any new constitu-
tional rule whose violation the Court would deem to constitute
structural error should be found to meet the requirements of
Teague's second exception in capital sentencing cases. This rule
is justified on three grounds. First, it would make Supreme
Court precedent regarding the Eighth Amendment and capital
punishment more consistent. Second, in light of the limitations
placed on federal habeas petitions under AEDPA, it is neces-
sary to recognize values besides finality that are present in ha-
beas review. Finally, existing retroactivity precedent has left
the door open for this type of refinement of retroactivity analy-
sis.
